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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF DUTCHESS
Present:
Hon. Maria G. Rosa
Justice
In the Matter of the Application of
SIDNEY BUTLER,
Petitioner,
-against-

DECISION, ORDER
AND JUDGMENT
Index # 2703/17

NYS BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondent.

The following papers were read on this Article 78 petition:
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
VERIFIED PETITION
EXHIBITS A - C
ANSWER AND RETURNS
EXHIBITS 1 - 12
REPLY
Petitioner brought this proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 78 to review a determination
of the Boru.ti of Parole denying his request for parole release. Petitioner was convicted in 199 1.aftcr
trial of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree and
sentenced to an indeterrn.jnatc term of twenty-five years to life. His convictions stemmed from the
incident that occuned on or about April 21, 1990 where he met a woman, went back to her apartment
and ultimately stabbed her thirty-four times with a ki tcben knife. Petitioner .fled the scene and was
arrested three days later. At the time he had one prior misdemeanor assault conviction for which
he was sentenced to a term of probation. Petitioner violated the terms of his probation and was
incarcerated for six months. He was on probation at the time he committed the offense for which
he is presently incarcerated. Petitioner first became eligible for parole release in 2015 and
reappeared before the Parole Board for an interview on February 1, 2017. He was 51 years old and
had been incarcerated for twenty-seven years. Following a brief interview the Board denied parole
and ordered petitioner held for twenty-four months. Petitioner's administrative appeal was denied
and this proceeding followed.

Pursuant to Executive Law §259-i(2)(c), the New York State Board of Parole is required to
consider a number ofstatutory factors in determining whether an inmate should be released to parole.
See Matter of Miller v. NYS Div. of Parole, 72 AD3d 690 (2nd Dept. 2010). The parole board must
also consider whether ''there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live
and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not incompatible with the
welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for
the law." 9 NYCRR 8002. 1. A parole board is not required to give equal weight to each statutory
factor, nor is it required specifically to articulate every factor considered. See Matter of Huntley v.
Evans, 77 AD3d 945 (2nd Dept. 2010). It is further permitted to place a greater emphasis on the
gravity of offense committed. See Matter of Serrano y. Alexander, 70 AD3d 1099, 1100 (3rd Dept.
2010). However, in the absence of aggravating circtimstances, a parole board may not deny release
solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense. Huntley v. Evans, 77 AD3d at 947; King v.
New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423 (P1 Dept. 1993)- Moreover, while the board need
not consider each guideline separately and has broad discretion to consider the importance of each
factor, the board must still consider the guidelines. Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(a). Finally, the board
must inform the inmate in writmg of the factors and reasons fordenial of parole and "(s]uchreasons
shall be given in detail and not in conclusory terms." Executive Law §259-i(2)(a); Malone v. Evans,
83 AD3d 719 (2 11d Dept. 2011). A determination by a parole board whether or not to grant parole is
discretionary, and if made in accordance with the relevant statutory factors, is not subject to judicial
review absent "a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety." Matter of Russo v. NYS Bd.
of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 (1980).
Executive Law §259-c(4) was amended in 2011 to require the board to establish new
procedures to use in making parole determinations. The statutory amendment was intended to have
parole boards focus on an applicant's rehabilitation and future rather than giving undue weight to
the crime of conviction and the inmate's pre-incarceration behavior. To assist the members of the
board in taking this approach when making parole determinations, the amendment required the
establishment of written guidelines incorporating risk and needs principles to measure an inmate's
rehabi lilati.on and likelihood of success upon release. See Ramirez v. Evans, L18 AD3d 707 (2nd
Dept. 2014). In response, the board of parole adopted the COMPAS (Correctional Offender
Management Profiling for Alternative Sanction) assessment tool. A COMP AS assessment was
prepared in connection with petitioner's February 1, 2017 appearance before the Parole Board.
At petitioner's parole hearing the Board questioned him about his crime ofconviction placing
particular emphasis on the fact that he stabbed his victim, a 29 year old female, more than thirty-four
times. The Board noted that he had completed all of his required programming and including ART
and ASAT and all phases of transitional services. It further referenced that he had remained "ticket
free for just a little over a year and that his ~ast ticket was a Tier II infraction from January 2016 but
that he had a significant Tier II disciplinary history." The Board stated that petitioner's COMPAS
risk assessment found him a low risk for felony violence, rearrest and reflected no concerns about
drug or alcohol use upon release. The Board further acknowledged petitioner completing his goals
to work in the custodial maintenance program, to continue progress in school and work on his self
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study and that he had completed substance abuse and violence programming. It was discussed that
upon release he could either go to his mother's or sister's but he wanted to participate in a program
called Ready, Willing & Able. The Board further mentioned that it had a certificate of achievement
for academic recognition that petitioner received and that the:ir records reflected that he did not need
any mental health services. Towards the end of the interview petitioner expressed his regret for the
events leading to his conviction and stated that he is trying to change his life and upon release would
take advantage of programs and become a better person in society.
At the conclusion of the hearing the Board issued a short decision denying parole. The
decision was based upon petitioner's crimes of conviction and that petitioner repeatedly stabbed his
victim more than thirty-four times which showed extreme violence and a callus disregard for human
life. The decision further noted that petitioner was on probation at the time of his offenses and that
his crimes of conviction represented an escalation in his behavior. The Board thus determined that
if petitioner was released there was a reasonable probability that he would not Jive at liberty again
without violating the law and that such release would be incompatible with the welfare of society
and deprecate the serious nature of his crimes as to undermine respect for the law.
This court's role is not to usurp the decision making authority statutorily vested in the Board
of Parole. It only has the authority to determine whether the Board considered the relevant statutory
factors in making its final determination. See Matter of Russo, supra. In conducting such review,
the court considers the parole interview and entire record before it but ultimately must assess
whether the Parole Board has articulated a rational basis for its written determination. Here, the
only facts set forth in the Board's written decision supporting its denial of parole are a recitation of
petitioner's ·crime of conviction, the violent nature of such crime and his prior misdemeanor
conviction. The Board mentioned that it considered sentencing minutes, COMPAS case plan and
risk assessment, rehabilitative efforts, letters of support, disciplinary record and all other factors.
An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason nor regard to the
facts. See Matter ofWooleyv. NYS D ept. of Corr. Servs., 15 NY3d 275 (2010). Put otherwise,
when an action is not based on an application of facts to a relevant standard but reflects a will to rule
without due regard to facts, it is arbitrary.

In this proceeding, as in so many of the Article 78 petitions challenging detenninations of
the Parole Board, the Board's written determination fails to set forth the facts SLtfficient to justify its
final determination. It is not the function of this court to review the record to determine whether
or not it, taken as a whole, would lend rational support to the Board's final determination. Instead,
it is the Board' s obligation to articL1late the facts that p.rovide the basis for its determination. Th1s
enables a reviewing court to determine whether tbe Board rationally applied those facts to the
requisite statutory factors in making its flnal determination. While the Parole Board is permitted to
place a greater emphasis on the gravity of the offense committed, it may not deny release solely on
the basis of the seriousness of the offense. See Huntley v. Evans, supra. Moreover, the fact that
petitioner had a prior misdemeanor conviction and violated his probation is not something the
petitioner has the abiLity to change. 1f these factors provided a sufficient basis for denying parole,
the Board could perpetually deny parole and petitioner would have no recourse. This would
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undoubtedly constitute an impermissible resentencing of petitioner. However, the Board's review
of the record reflects consideration of the petitioner's institutional disciplinary record including a
disciplinary proceeding as recent as 2016. The Board's failure to articulate in its written decision
any facts other than the recitation of petitioner's crimes of conviction and prior criminal record
require this court to remand the matter. Therefore, it is
ORDERED that the petition is granted to the extent that the matter is remanded to the Board
of Parole to make a de novo determination in accordance with CPLR Article 78 and Executive Law
§259-i.
The foregoing constitutes the decision, order and judgment of the Court.

/5 ,

Dated: February
2018
Poughkeepsie, New York
ENTER:

MARIA G. ROSA, J.S.C.

Sidney Butler DIN 91A2844
Otisville Correctional Facility
PO Box 8
Otisville, NY 10963
Eric T. Schneiderman
Attorney General of the State of New York
One Civic Center Plaza, Suite 401
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601

Pursuant to CPLR §5513, an appeal as of right must be taken within thirty days after service by a
party upon the appellant of a copy of the judgment or order appealed from and written notice of its
entry, except that when the appellant has served a copy of the judgment or order and written notice
of its entry, the appeal must be taken within thirty days thereof.
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